Technological advances present rms in many industries with opportunities to substantially improve their product's capabilities in short periods of time. Customers who invest in these products may, however, react adversely to rapid improvements that obsoletes their previous versions by deferring their purchase. In industrial markets, there is an emerging trend of sequentially improving products designed to be upgraded in a modular fashion. We study in this paper the impact of product architecture and introduction timing on the launch of rapidly improving products. We nd that by localizing performance improvements in a sequence of upgradable modules of the product, a rm can better manage the introduction of rapidly improving products. Specically, we show that modular upgradability can reduce the need for slowing the pace of innovation or foregoing upgrade pricing. The additional exibility in pricing and timing makes the modular upgradable approach preferable over an integrated architecture, even in some situations where there may be distinct performance or cost-related disadvantages to pursuing the modular architecture. We dierentiate between proprietary and non-proprietary approaches to modular upgradability and consider the implications for prots. Our central contribution in this paper is the innovative integration of product architecture with pricing and timing decisions for managing the introduction of rapidly improving products.
Introduction
Major technological advances in the physical and biological sciences and an increasingly digitally networked world-wide R&D community drive rapid quality improvements in many product categories. It is well known that speeds of microprocessors have increased substantially over the last decade, and Intel has emerged as the dominant rm by maintaining a rapid pace of innovation according to Moore's Law (Newsweek, 2002) . Sequential introduction of improved versions are also routine for many other electronics and software products (PC Magazine, 2003) . We call such serial commercialization of improving technologies, whose performance improves over time not only in absolute terms but also in customer-discounted terms, Rapid Sequential Innovation (RSI) .
Firms engaging in RSI face certain unique challenges in persuading their customers to purchase their current product rather than wait for an improved version. Dhebar (1994) showed in a twoperiod setting that under RSI when rational customers anticipate a monopolist seller's opportunistic pricing behavior, the rm's prot-maximizing pricing scheme results in no sales of one of the versions of products. Facing rapid improvements, prior customers may regret their buying decision and prospective customers could delay their purchase timing. This forces a monopolist -who primarily uses prices to segment markets under rapid sequential innovation -to consider restraining the pace of innovation. In a subsequent paper, Kornish (2001) showed that the rm can partly address this issue of customer balking by committing to not oering special upgrade prices for the improved second-period product. While a rm may avoid articial introduction delays by placing restrictions on the way products are priced, prior customers have come to expect special upgrade prices in many product categories (such as application software and other technology products). With customer relationship management (CRM) systems in place, rms also increasingly use this data and special upgrade discounts to attract existing customers. Under these circumstances, a monopolist rm may not be able to credibly commit upfront that it will not oer special upgrade prices in the future.
In this paper, we study a product architecture based approach that expands the rm's degrees of freedom to include product design decisions for managing the special challenges associated with rapid sequential innovation. Specically, we study the case when a rm considers partitioning rapidly advancing products into improving and stable (industry-standard) modules, enabling itself to focus on its core skills and convince customers that their investments in products won't be totally 2 obsoleted in short periods of time. Products thus designed, whose performance can be improved by replacing a minimal set of components are termed Modular Upgradable (MU) .
The modular upgradable approach is gaining popularity with many industrial products such as rackable computer systems, semiconductor photo-lithography equipment, and optical inspection systems. In each of these categories, customers are able to assimilate sequentially improving technologies by buying specic modules, without obsoleting their entire system purchased earlier. In the computer industry, rms such as IBM and Rackable systems have been advancing the trend of modular upgradability, which allows their customers to selectively and incrementally upgrade their system. In the optical inspection market, for example, the rm ViTechnology designed and launched its new series of products so that the camera modules can be easily upgraded to meet future accuracy requirements for inspections. Similarly, in the semiconductor photo-lithography equipment segment, industrial customers such as Intel and AMD are able to upgrade their systems in a modular fashion by buying from rms such as ASM Lithography, Canon, and Nikon. Given the escalating cost of such equipment and the commoditization of end markets, customers prefer the productivity gains and cost savings achieved by upgrading in modules even while incurring the eort involved in installation and modular upgrades.
We study when and how modular upgradability helps a technology supplier manage rapid sequential innovation. Our approach is to view the commercialization of rapidly improving technologies as a combination of three separate, but related steps: product design, introduction timing, and pricing (going beyond the last pricing step considered in the prior literature). Specically, we focus on the impact of selecting dierent product architectures and component sourcing options on optimal introduction timing and pricing. Customers who purchase these products do so for productivity improvements, but may incur both costs of initially integrating and subsequently upgrading the modules. We nd that in many instances, the rm may gainfully introduce the new product earlier without adhering to constraining price commitments by using a modular product architecture.
A central nding of this work is that combining a modular upgradable product architecture with pricing can alleviate the eects of adverse customer reaction to rapid obsolescence and improve rm prots in a wide range of situations. While such an approach might also apply to consumer markets, there are some additional issues which limit the use of modular upgradability that we discuss in the nal section.
3 formalize and analyze each of these proprietary choices, identify optimal prices for the sequence of products, and derive conditions under which either product introduction approach is appropriate.
Our results underscore the importance of taking design and introduction timing into consideration and linking them with pricing while launching a product family. Our nding that in many instances optimal launch times are advanced under a modular architecture also highlights a previously ignored demand side advantage to modularity. Our analysis proceeds in two parts. Initially, we temporarily ignore the timing decision to obtain optimal prices for dierent design choices; in this we invoke the concept of Sub-Game-Perfect equilibrium. Later, we endogenize the introduction timing decision for the dierent scenarios. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The literature related to this work is reviewed in Section 2. We dene our constructs and formulate the 1 One of ASML's stated business strategies is to oer continuing improvements in productivity... by introducing advanced technology, based on the modular, upgradeable design of ASML products (ASML, 2001 ). ASML's newly introduced stepper system TWINSCAN TM , is also a modular upgradable system comprised of components from several other manufacturers (ASML, 2005) . 4 model in Section 3. The analysis and main results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5. We conclude with a discussion of analytical results and managerial implications in Section 6.
Literature Review
This paper is related to two separate streams of literature, namely: (i) product design and architecture, and (ii)sequential innovation, which we review in that order.
Product Design and Architecture
There exists a growing body of literature on the design of new products. Product architecture specically is the scheme by which the performance quality (function) of a product is allocated to physical components (Ulrich, 1995) , and has important implications yet to be uncovered in the literature. In a modular product, the mapping from performance quality to components is one to one. Modularization adds to the real option value of any product's design; while integral products have to be redesigned for each application, modular architectures can be used as platforms in several variations of the basic product (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Baldwin and Clark, 2000) .
Product modularity also induces economies of scale due to component commonality, and these production eciencies have to be factored into product line decisions (Kim and Chhajed, 2000; Desai et al., 2001) . Other advantages of modularity arise from the ability to reuse previously designed components, save costs in logistics, and make product variety protable (Fisher et al., 1999; Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990) . A more recent and detailed survey of the literature of modularity can be found in Mikkola and Gassmann (2003) . In spite of the advantages of modular systems, an integral product architecture is preferable under certain circumstances due to the adverse impact of modularization on product design (Ulrich and Ellison, 1999) . Modular architecture has been embraced by the industry for two main reasons (The Wall Street Journal, 1991) . First, modular innovation can be more eective than systemic innovation because of the ability of the organization to transfer accumulated knowledge across successive generations of new products, resulting in longevity of the platform and wider variety of models (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995) . Second, customers nd the task of adjusting to modular innovations easier than coping with radical systemic changes (Sanchez, 1999) .
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Modular upgradability is a specic form of modularity, in which the product is designed to be upgradable in modules, thereby allowing for longitudinal component reuse. Upon deciding to make its product upgradable in modules, a rm must still choose between proprietary and industrystandard alternatives to source its modules (Morris and Ferguson, 1993) . This choice becomes relevant when industry-standard subsystems can become substitutes for a rm's components. Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993) investigate Sun Microsystems' architectural strategy and conclude that an open (non-proprietary) architecture encourages manufacturers of complementary products and even rivals to make and support compatible products. Our work identies the value from a market and operational perspective of using non-proprietary industry-standard components in conjunction with rm-proprietary improving modules.
Sequential Innovation
Durable goods manufacturers have been a subject of long-standing interest in the economics literature 2 . Coase (1972) argued that rational expectations of suciently patient customers will eliminate the opportunity to sell the good at dierent prices to customers who value it dierently. This competition from goods sold earlier makes leasing a preferable alternative to selling durable goods (Bulow, 1982) , and a selling rm also has an incentive to reduce the physical life of an old product compared to a leasing rm (Waldman, 1996) . Interference from early sales may be controlled by using mechanisms such as buybacks, planned obsolescence or trade-ins (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998) . These tactics are often not feasible leading to excessively slow product introductions (Fishman and Rob, 2000) . Our work proposes product design as an essential ingredient in the sustenance fast new product introduction.
When customer valuations of a product are not uniform, a durable product may be priced dynamically to achieve intertemporal price discrimination (Stokey, 1979) . A rm can also use a product line to discriminate in such a market, but low end customers exert a negative externality on the rm's ability do so (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) . The eects of cannibalization on new product introduction have been studied for static and improving technologies by Moorthy and Png (1992) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) respectively, and later in the context of development intensive products by Krishnan and Zhu (2003) . This paper adds to this literature by studying the tradeos in timing 2 Dhebar (1994) provides a more detailed review of this literature. 6 product launch when the core technology available is improving rapidly.
Although we discuss sequential innovations in general, this work is motivated by critical problems faced by rapidly-improving products in the market, which have not received sucient attention. Dhebar (1994) highlighted the problems faced by a monopolist rm in intertemporally discriminating among its customers in the context of rapid sequential innovation. Innovators have to be mindful of customers' distaste for rapid improvements that would make an earlier purchase obsolete. Unfortunately, in most industries, especially those that involve nascent technological standards, delaying commercialization of advanced technologies is not an option due to a number of reasons. First, product quality in relatively new industries is closely tied to the underlying technology's properties, knowledge about which could be public. A second characteristic of such technologies is the opportunity for smaller businesses to enter the market if a monopolistic rm fails to oer the best possible quality. Third, selling a durable product with little or no improvement over time can expose the monopolist rm to competition from second hand markets in later periods (Coase, 1972; Bulow, 1982) . Kornish (2001) showed that by foregoing its ability to oer its preferred or installed base customers a special upgrade price for the improved product, the rm will be able to signal to its customers that their purchase decisions in the rst period will not be unduly used to the rm's advantage. However, it is not clear if either rapid innovation or intertemporal price discrimination should belong to the set of objectives of a prot maximizing rm. To address these issues, we allow the rm to decide the number of products to launch and rate of improvement in addition to determining the optimal product architecture.
It should be noted that our primary concern is about product selection decisions of customers who derive value by using these products at a personal level. For a recent overview of adoption decisions of organizations that buy improving technologies used in production of other goods and services, see Hoppe (2002) . Optimal pricing policies for a rm selling improving technologies to competing manufacturers have been developed by Erat and Kavadias (2004) . The focus in this literature has been to capture decisions made by prot maximizing agents who adopt (industrial) technologies and potentially compete among themselves, while we concentrate on rational utility maximizing customers. We also do not consider strategic interactions of the manufacturer-retailer supply chain form, which may inuence the structure of the product line (Villas-Boas, 1998) . 7
Our primary contribution is the identication of the linkage between design, pricing, and launch timing for new products. It is interesting to note how combining product design and pricing improves rm prots while also accelerating new product introduction; to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the early eorts in studying the economic benets of a combined approach to product architecture and pricing. In the following section, we present a basic model of designing and pricing a modular, improving product based on the improving core technology. Results for the proprietary and non-proprietary approaches are presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Launch times are then derived as a function of the technology's characteristics and development costs.
Model Setting and Description
In this section we describe the sequential introduction problem faced by a monopolist rm that has developed an early version of the product P 1 , and is in possession of an advanced technology which could be transformed into a new product P 2 with improved performance quality. We rst discuss the specic assumptions and their implications before providing a timeline for interaction between the rm and its customers in closing. In the rest of the paper, we use the word customer to refer to an industrial customer that purchases the product, and rm to refer to the developer who sells these products.
Modeling Assumptions
The products under consideration (both hardware or software) are purchased by the industrial customers for productivity improvement. The value a customer derives from the productivity improvement of a particular version of the product depends on the version's basic performance quality, the duration for which it is used, the benets of learning that accrues by using, the rate at which future benets are discounted, and the eectiveness with which the customer uses the product.
• Productivity Benets and Learning by Customers. The product of quality q provides an instantaneous productivity, or output per unit of time, given by z (q, t). In addition, customers realize productivity improvements over time as they familiarize themselves with the product's capabilities and gain expertise in applying them. Specically, they experience an instantaneous rate of learning, which we represent as L. When a customer uses a product with a 8 productivity of z per unit time for a duration of t, learning-by-doing increases the per unit productivity to ze Lt . For notational simplicity, customer learning that occurs over a period of length t is captured through the parameter γ (t) = e Lt . Let the output over a period of duration t of a product of quality q is given by x q (t).
• The rm and customers may borrow at an interest rate of r. Productivity benets and payments that are delayed by a period of length t are discounted by a factor of δ(t) = e −rt .
x q (t)is related to the the maximum lifetime utility of the product f (q), the learning and discount rates through Equation 1.
To ensure that customers who buy the rst version do not trivially reject the second version, we restrict our attention to product categories where the learning rate does not exceed the rate of innovation. Specically, we assume that
is bounded, we assume that r > L.
• Industrial customers that may buy the product dier in their ability to assimilate and apply the product's oerings to improve their productivity. This ability, measured by index v, is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 3 . The lifetime value a type v customer derives by using the product depends on the quality of the product q t . W (q, v), the reservation price of customer v for a product of quality q, is given in Equation 2 below. When the improved product is launched, given that v has P 1 , v(f (q 2 ) − f (q 1 )) is customer willingness to pay for P 2 . The function f (q t ) represents the benet of a unit of product quality 4 .
• Customers incur an installation cost of C I when a product is installed and an an upgrading cost C U when upgrading the product. In industrial contexts, product installation requires assem-bling various modules together at the site of installation, re-calibration of sensitive equipment, and customization. However, while customers are required to assemble the modules for each installation in some product categories, other manufacturers also oer installation services for new buyers 5 . We model these two cases separately. In Section 4.4, we consider the eect of these cost parameters C I and C U on the optimal design and pricing decisions for the various modules.
• We assume that the marginal production costs are negligible compared to the xed costs of product development, which is increasingly the case in knowledge-intensive industries. Product development costs depend on t d , and the relationship is presented in Section 5.2.
Consumption and pricing decisions depend on the rate of sequential improvement. Rapid sequential innovations are dierent from more gradual improvements since performance quality of P 2 exceeds that of P 1 even in present value (Equation 3). We are unaware of the existence of second hand markets for industrial products that motivate this work. Rapid sequential innovation, by rendering older versions obsolete, further reduces the viability of markets for used goods. Therefore, we assume that these do not exist. This assumption is useful to keep the focus on the architecture-innovation interaction.
Rapid Improvement
The rm does not condition prices on previous purchases. Therefore, we do not make any assumptions on the level of anonymity involved in repeat purchases. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) analyze the eect of anonymity on the sequential pricing strategies of the rm, but unlike this work, they (i) do not consider the impact of product architecture on consumption, and (ii) restrict themselves to gradual rates of product improvement.
The sequence of the customer's and rm's actions is shown in Figure 2 . The rm rst makes its decisions about the inter-generational product architecture (integral or modular architecture) and launches the rst period product P 1 . Customers then make their rst-period purchase or wait decisions based on the price, quality, and the architecture of the rst-period product and the expected price and quality of the improved (second-period) product. In accordance with the prior work on rapid sequential innovation, we assume all customers have the same expectations for price and quality of the second-period product. In the second period, the improved product P 2 is released based on the architectural decision made earlier at a price that the rm nds optimal. Customers base their second-period purchase decisions on the announced prices and qualities of the improved product. Prior research on this topic did not include the architectural decision that we consider for the rm at the beginning. The interaction between architecture and pricing oers an additional degree of freedom, which forms the point of departure for this paper. 
Architectural Choice and Modular Upgradability
The literature on rapid sequential innovation assumes that each version of the product is an integral unit. Further, the impact of not launching the inferior version is also not considered. Here we explicitly relax both assumptions to capture demand-side forces that shape a product's evolution and its architecture over time. The salient characteristics of sequentially improving modular products are two-fold.
(a) Product Partitioning: The product consists of physically and functionally separable component subsystems. A modular design approach involving a one-to-one mapping from functions to components allows for such product partitioning (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Ulrich, 1995) .
(b) Localized Improvements: Quality improvement is localized in only some of the component subsystems. By this we imply that the older version of the product/system can be upgraded by replacing only a subset of components.
Each product P t of the sequence is an aggregation of components; the relationship between functionalities of the dierent components and performance qualities is captured by the operator 
Instead of considering quality enhancements at the component level, we take a consolidated view of the product and assume that each version is separated into a Stable Module (S t ) and an Improving
Module (I t ). We consider modular product systems in which all the signicant improvement is localized on a subsystem I t produced by the monopolist rm. As mentioned earlier, we consider a two period model (T = 2). Note that localization implies that the stable module does not undergo major functional changes and will be represented by S (S ≡ S 1 ≡ S 2 ). The dierent modules are produced at constant marginal costs (c 1 , c 2 and c s for I 1 , I 2 and S respectively). Though our general model is suited for multiple dimensions of quality, we focus on a one-dimensional measure q, which can either be a weighted measure of the constituents or the most dominant element of Q.
Modularization also has the potential to aect the quality of the product. Technologically, the product may become bulkier and creation of additional interfaces may lower product quality (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Ulrich and Ellison, 1999) . Also, a customer choosing to upgrade the improving module may experience a loss of quality due to additional assembly. We account for these negative eects of modularity by explicitly considering a loss of quality parameter, α ∈ [0, 1).
Suppose the products introduced in our two period model are of qualities q 1 and q 2 when designed as an integral system. But in a modular system, the quality of the improved version is reduced to
The impact of this quality loss is analyzed in following sections. To consider RSI products alone, in our discussion of modularity, we limit our attention to combinations of α and δ c such that:
12
A simple form is used in the numerical analysis in section 5. We assume that
The rm decides whether the product sequence would be modular as described above, or if a quality-optimized integral product will be independently developed in each period. If the modular architecture is selected, there are two fundamentally dierent design alternatives for the modular product described above. I t can be designed to work with a stable module S manufactured by other rms or only with that made by the focal monopolist rm. To investigate the inuence of modular upgradability in these two cases, we distinguish between Proprietary and Non-proprietary modular upgradable products. In the rest of the section, we describe the pricing possibilities and cost side eects for each of these product architectures.
Proprietary Modular Upgradable Systems (MP)
When customers must purchase both the improving and stable modules from the same rm, the rm is said to follow a proprietary modular upgradable approach. The improving modules, I t , are uniquely designed for each product, P t . Both versions of I t are designed to be compatible with the rm's own stable module, S.
The two versions of the improving modules, I 1 and I 2 are priced at p 1 and p 2 respectively.
S, which can be used in conjunction with any improving module, is sold at the same price p s (at margin p s − c s ) in both periods. If the price of S is allowed to change, the rm holds the ability to price the whole product opportunistically in the second period and hence continues to face the same problem associated with selling a sequence of integral products. Our primary interest, therefore, is in situations in which p s is unchanging between periods.
While modularity allows customers to retain the stable module, replacing the improving module often involves tedious and costly procedures. We model this upgrading eort as a cost C U incurred by a customer who buys the rst version and upgrades in a modular fashion later. Since several manufacturers oer packaged products for new buyers and improving modules for upgraders, we assume that the upgrading cost is not applicable to customers who buy either the rst or the second version exclusively. The results presented, however, can be easily extended to a more general case.
and D u be the set of customers who do not buy any product, buy only the rst version, buy only the second version, and those who buy both versions respectively.
and D u be the corresponding number of customers. In a proprietary system, the rm gets revenues from sales of improving and stable modules, but delayed benets are discounted. The rm's problem in the second period is:
While launching the early version, the rm should be mindful of the eect p s will have on the later sales as well. The rm's rst period problem is:
To make our results comparable to the existing literature on RSI and to achieve compact analytical expressions, we rst ignore cost savings and inter-product-line substitutability in our formulation.
A commitment issue still challenges the rm designing MP systems. In an attempt to sell a higher volume of non-improving components when the advanced version is launched, the rm can willfully renege from its previous commitment to make future improving modules compatible with old stable modules. Firms with a weak or insucient record of credibly upholding these compatibility commitments may use the following architectural approach.
Non-Proprietary Modular Upgradable Systems (MN)
When the product is designed so that the stable module is a commodity that can be purchased from the open market, the rm is said to follow a non-proprietary modular upgradable approach.
We consider the case of the general purpose module that will be produced and supplied competitively by many rms (at price p s ); this is characteristic of the desktop computer industry where several competitors supply some basic components with standard interfaces and minimal dierentiation, and some components that improve with time are produced by a few manufacturers. An industry structure of this type could also be formed when a manufacturer of a modular system opens up the architecture of its system and/or certain functional, spatial, and compatibility specications to 14 rivals and partners. The rm sets prices p 1 and p 2 by solving the following problems in the two periods. It foregos not only the ability to price the stable module but also revenues from selling the stable module. Optimal solutions for the problem 6 are found in Section 4.3.
The external rms, by virtue of experience gained by manufacturing S as a commodity, may be able to deliver a higher overall product quality through its stable module. For example, customers who purchase ASML's micro-lithography equipment for semiconductor manufacturing are able to upgrade the optical elements by purchasing image-sensing components from Carl Zeiss. We represent the technological inferiority of completely proprietary systems using the parameter β (β ∈ (0, 1]).
When the non-proprietary choice delivers product qualities q t , the proprietary solutions, irrespective of the architecture, are capable of delivering only customer perceived quality βq t .
Often proprietary modular products deliver higher quality than non-proprietary alternatives (β > 1). In our context, the non-proprietary designs have no value in these cases for rms which have commitment credibility. We ignore this uninteresting case in the rest of the paper. Further, we appreciate the fact that β is endogenous to technological and market specications, but reserve its determination for future work.
Selecting, procuring and installing an o-the-shelf stable module entails signicant eort and cost for a customer in the non-proprietary case. Each installation of a system results in costs associated
with interfacing the open-sourced Stable module with a new Improving module. We represent this cost as C I . Note that this installation cost is expended twice by an upgrading customer whereas the upgrading cost C U is incurred only during the upgrading step.
Proprietary Integral Systems
The default option for the rm is to provide an integral product where the stable and improving module are not separable. The advantage is the lack of any quality loss arising from modularity (α = 0), and this is the approach that has been studied by prior papers. Specically, Kornish has shown that the optimal approach is for the rm to not oer special upgrade prices to early buyers.
The pricing problem for the rm, which is obtained by adding the constraint p s = 0 in problem 15 (5,4) above, is shown below.
If the advanced technology represents a signicant improvement over the early version and if the costs of accelerated development are not overwhelming, it might be in the rm's best interest to avoid launching the early version. This is simply obtained by setting D 1 = D u = 0 in (7). Note that it is not necessary to modularize the product when only the advanced product is released.
Model Analysis
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First we identify the optimal prices for proprietary and non-proprietary modular architectures for xed t 1 and t 2 . Here, we take the development time (Dhebar, 1994; Kornish, 2001) , while also making the presentation linear.
The rm rst derives the demand pattern that will be generated by its prices. Customers anticipate the pricing reactions of the rm in the second period based on their consumption decisions in the rst period. To obtain a consistent set of prices, beliefs and consumption decisions, we look for sub-game-perfect solutions. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we specically focus on role of architecture and normalize the installation costs C I to zero. Subsequently, we extend our analysis to include installation cost in Section 4. 
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For all non-negative prices (p 1 , p 2 , p s ), the market is divided according to one of the following segmentation patterns (SP) when the product is improving rapidly.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix Property 3. Market Segmentation for Gradual Improvement δf (q α
Proof. Similar to proof of Property 2.
Property 2 provides some intuition about the eect of product modularity when the improvement is deemed rapid. Consider the eect of varying p s for a given pair improving module prices p 1 and p 2 , and suppose that p 1 and p 2 are within reasonable bounds 7 . When p s ≤ P 1 , only a fraction of rst period customers upgrade when I 2 is available. However, if p s is raised such that p s ≥ P 2 , all rst period customers upgrade their products. If the rm commits to an architecture with a higher stable module price relative to the overall costs of P 1 and P 2 , customers can retain a signicant part of their initial investment when they upgrade. This enables easier retention of the customer base as the rm moves along a path of rapid innovation. Firms involved in RSI face the problem of balking by customers, who temporarily or permanently stop upgrading their products till technological improvements become less turbulent. Dhebar (1996) suggests that producers should pace innovation to match customer ability to adopt; but it is clear that architectural choice can result in the same without slowing down the innovative eort.
Optimal Pricing for Modular Proprietary System (MP)
Special upgrade prices cannot be oered for integral products in markets where rst period customers cannot distinguish themselves, but modular upgradability can be used in lieu of upgrade pricing even in these circumstances. Proposition 1 gives optimal prices when the rm has the ability to 7 Note that when p 1 and p 2 are small, SP3 never obtains. commit to a constant price, p s . In proving it (Appendix), we assume that c 1 = c 2 = c s = 0, but the validity of the main results has been tested numerically for several combinations of costs.
Proposition 1. Optimal Pricing for Modular Proprietary Systems
The optimal set of prices for the modules that result in a SP 1 sub-game perfect equilibrium are as follows:
The optimal set of prices for the modules that result in a SP 4 sub-game perfect equilibrium are as follows:
These equilibriums are unique in pure-strategies.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
The optimal price for the stable module (p * s ) is higher than that of the improving module. Higher p s makes customer purchase decision easier since it leaves a smaller margin in the second period for the rm to price opportunistically. Further, when p s is larger, customers are able to protect more of their prior investment when the product is upgraded. For all rates of innovation (t d ) and the product qualities, the prot maximizing strategy for the rm is to set the price of S at the upper bound dictated by the market participation constraint. Therefore, to induce the maximum number of customers to upgrade their products in a modular fashion, the rm subsidizes the rst version of its improving module completely through sales of the stable module 8 .
The stable module prices are non-increasing in γ, and therefore in learning rate r L . To understand this, rst note that all of the equilibriums identied in Proposition 1 are intertemporally discriminating, in which high-end customers buy P 1 and upgrade to P 2 . These customers, whose preferences are critical in determining the optimal prices, view the rst version mainly as a nondurable good that will be used only for a single period. When learning-by-using contributes significantly to the perceived lifetime quality of a product, a larger portion of the benets are delayed.
Recall that the per period productivity of the product (of quality q) is given by (1 − γδ) f (q). As a result, the price high-end customers are willing to pay for the rst version is lower, resulting in the inverse relationship between p * s and r L for a given f (q).
The relationship between second period price p * 2 and r L , however, depends on the segmentation pattern chosen by the rm. In SP 1, the second version is sold exclusively to high-end upgraders who not only own the previous version, but have also accumulated expertise in using it. To induce them to overcome this acquired attachment to the old product, the rm is forced to discount the second version further. Therefore, p * 2 in non-increasing in r L . To further understand the role of r L , let us consider the special case where r L = 0 (γ = 1).
Corollary 1. When customers do not realize productivity gains by using a product, the optimal prices lead to a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium
First, the optimal prices are independent of the rate of improvement when learning eects are absent. This indicates that unlike the manufacturer of an integral product, the producer of such a modular upgradable system need not regulate the pace of innovation or place additional pricing constraints. However, the pricing policy shown above is not intertemporally discriminating. By targeting the same set of customers with either version, the rm optimally skims the market at the same level in both periods. This result is consistent with previous observations on intertemporal discrimination (without innovation or customer learning). The price cuts necessary to attract a wider market induce too many buyers to delay their purchases, making price discrimination unprotable (Stokey, 1979) . Additionally, we nd that an attempt to be aggressive with the rst product (in a proprietary architecture) results in turning away too many higher end customers of the improved product.
Optimal Pricing for Modular Non-proprietary Design (MN)
The point of modular upgradability is easy upgrading and investment protection; it removes the shadow of obsolescence from the users mind and, from a cost standpoint, it extends the depreciation time for the purchased equipment. But this point may not be conveyed successfully to customers unless they are convinced that the stable module price p s will not be lowered later to take advantage 20 of their rst period purchase decisions. Making the stable module widely available as a separate retail item or an industry standard commodity could help address customer concerns. In this section, we focus on the use of non-proprietary modular product architectures as a vehicle to facilitate adoption of rapidly improving products.
We model that a competitively supplied version of S is available. The rm sets prices p 1 and p 2 , while the standard module is available in the market at a competitive price of p s . Customers' investment in the stable module S is taken into consideration by the rm when prices for I t are xed. The optimal pricing policies for RSI are described in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Optimal Pricing for Non-Proprietary Systems under RSI
Under Rapid Sequential Innovation, the feasibility of any segmentation pattern and optimal prices depend on the price of the stable module p s , as follows.
A SP 1 sub-game perfect equilibrium can be achieved when p s <
(1−γδ)f (q 1 ) 2(1−δ) . The optimal prices are
A SP 4 sub-game perfect equilibrium can be achieved can be achieved under the following conditions.
For each γ, δ and α, there exist φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 such that the optimal pricing strategies are
Proof. The proof, along with expressions for φ 1 , φ 2 and φ 3 , is provided in the Appendix.
As discussed in Section 4.1, the SP 1 purchase pattern corresponds to the case when the high-end customers buy in the rst and second periods, while customers in the middle purchase only in the rst period. When the cost of procuring the o-the-shelf module is suciently high δ) ), the rst period oering is expensive, thus pushing the market toward delayed adoption. Therefore, it is not protable to introduce the rst version as the basic product intended for a wider customer base. 21
Only customers at the higher end of market are interested in the rst period version in SP 4.
They are motivated by not having to invest in S again at the point of upgrade. Therefore, a low p s implies that the rm has to select a lower p 1 to launch I 1 successfully. As a result, when p s ≤ φ 1 , the low price of the stable module makes launching I 1 unprotable. Therefore, the prices of the improving modules are non-increasing in p s , indicating that adopting a costlier stable module results in reduced revenue per unit produced for the focal rm.
Pricing with Installation Costs
In this section, we extend the results from Sections 4.2 and 4.3 above to more general settings where customers incur either (i) a xed cost C I for installing each purchase under non-proprietary design, and (ii) a xed C U for disassembling and assembling when a modular proprietary system is upgraded. While C I reduces the customer's net benet from each version, C U aects only customers that upgrade. These costs also increases the customer's resistance to upgrade when the better product is available. In Proposition 3 below, we derive the equilibrium prices charged by the rm when costs incurred by customers are considered.
Proposition 3. Modular Proprietary Systems with Upgrade Cost
The SP1 equilibrium is achievable when C U ≤ ω U 1 . The optimal prices that result in a sub-game perfect equilibrium are as follows:
The SP4 equilibrium is achievable when C U ≤ ω U 4 . The optimal prices that result in a sub-game perfect equilibrium are as follows:
and
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1
Note that it is protable to oer modular upgradability only when the upgrading cost C U is less than ω U i . Naturally, prohibitively high costs of upgrading dissuade customers from exercising this 22 option provided through product design, even when the producer packages the modules together for new buyers. When the stable module is non-proprietary, rms seldom oer packaged products to consumers. In Proposition 4 below, we derive optimal prices when installation is performed by customers in each period. While third-party providers may oer the service of integration, a cost is incurred in obtaining this service. Therefore, we do not consider upgrading costs separately.
Proposition 4. Modular Non-Proprietary Systems with Installation Costs.
The SP 1 sub-game perfect equilibrium can be achieved when C I ≤ ω I 1 . The optimal prices are
A SP 4 sub-game perfect equilibrium can be achieved when C I ≤ ω I 4 . For each γ, δ, α and C I , there
and φ
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2
We nd that the prices charged by the rm for either product, and therefore the prots, decrease with C I and C U . Further the prots vanish when installation and upgrade costs exceed certain thresholds. This is due to the natural downward pressure that installation costs exert on a customer's willingness to buy or upgrade a product. Industrial customers typically enjoy the services of maintenance crews for testing and calibrating new machines, which lowers the installation cost relative to product quality. However, consumers who buy gadgets for personal use often nd the effort and frustration associated with installation and upgrading costly relative to the utility derived.
Firms that cater consumer markets might prefer to side-step complication installation instructions 23 by assembling the gadgets before selling them. In that regard, the results from Propositions 3 and 4 oer an explanation for the skewed prevalence of modular upgradability primarily in industrial products.
While the results in this Section are derived assuming that the same cost is incurred equally by new and upgrading customers, the results easily extend to the case in which new installations and modular upgrades require dierent eort levels. We do not present this case since the more complicated expressions add little value to our discussion.
Optimal Architectures and Innovation Rate
In this section, we rst compare the protabilities of the dierent product design approaches to determine the conditions under which the modular architectures yield higher prot. We then treat the innovation rate as a decision variable to examine how the optimal innovation rates compare under the modular and integral architectures.
Appropriateness of Dierent Architectures
A comparison of the protability of the dierent product design approaches indicates that under fairly general conditions, the modular design and pricing approaches yield prots superior to the integral design choices. Here we compare dierent architectures for a pre-specied launch time t d .
Let the optimal prots from the integral architecture, the modular proprietary architecture, and the modular non-proprietary architecture be π IN , π M P , and π M N (p s ) respectively. We assume that the integral product can be sold in the RSI case with a guarantee that special upgrade prices will not be oered later (which is optimal for the integral architecture). The architectural choices can be ordered with respect to the eciency they allow in price discrimination when there are no adverse eects of modularity (α = 0) and when there are no technological disadvantages in adopting proprietary solutions (β = 1).
Proposition 5. When α = 0 and β = 1, the prots are ordered as follows:
1. The modular proprietary architecture results in a higher prot than the integral architecture
2. For all levels of stable module prices, the modular proprietary approach is more protable than the non-proprietary approach
The rst part of the proposition, which presents the dominance of modular proprietary architecture over the integral architecture, is driven by the additional pricing exibility of setting p s in the modular proprietary solution (π M P ). Also, when product quality is not impacted due to proprietary architecture, the rm's prot with the non-proprietary architecture (π M N (p s )) is lower than that of the proprietary modular architecture (π M P ) because the rm does not earn revenues from the stable module (p s goes to the rm manufacturing S).
We next compare the design choices for dierent levels of r and α, which capture the customer patience (δ) and any adverse impact of modularization on product quality. Since α is a direct measure of the loss of product quality that occurs due to modularization, a high α represents a greater implicit cost of designing a modular product. Therefore, for any customer discounting factor δ, we observe that modular solutions, proprietary and non-proprietary, are more attractive than the no-upgrade pricing approach for lower levels of α. Since our primary interest is in the ecacy of modular upgradability in managing rapid sequential innovation, we exclude combinations of α and δ that lead to an articial throttling of innovation 9 .
When the rm has the option of selecting between a proprietary and non-proprietary approach, customers' ability to leverage any investment in the stable module S becomes more important.
When the inter-version duration t d is longer, the present value of the improved version is reduced. when t d is higher, the rm's discounted valuation of its own second period revenues is lower; this lowers the real cost of oering larger upgrade discounts (implicitly, through p s ) in the second period.
As a result of these two forces, the rm nds it optimal to oer the proprietary modular architecture for smaller values of δ.
The inuence of β can be understood using the example in Figure 4 , which shows the variation of architectural decisions between two levels of β. A higher value of β denotes a lower disparity between the rm's ability and the industry standard in producing S or a greater level of acceptance of proprietary products. When the rm is more competitive, i.e. when β = 0.875, the non-proprietary solution is dominant in region MN, the proprietary modular solution should be adopted in regions MP and B, and a non-modular product should be sold in all other regions. When β falls to 0.85, the non-proprietary modular architecture is the best alternative for the rm in regions MN, A and B. The integral system is protable only in region INT. As β approaches 1, the non-proprietary solution is not used under any condition. The non-proprietary approach becomes the ideal choice as β approaches 0.
As we discussed in Section 4.4, the additional benets customers derive from modular upgradability come at the loss of installation and upgrading services previously performed by the rm itself.
Naturally, if the interfaces connecting the modules are complex, these costs are larger and customers are more willing to select one of the versions. In Figure 5 , as C I increases, the non-proprietary so- lution is less protable than both modular proprietary and integrated designs. Similarly, a larger C U decreases the attractiveness of the modular proprietary alternative. While these results suggest that modular architectures are perhaps more conducive to certain market and technological environments than others, they also reveal the importance of designing for easy upgradability. We discuss these in further detail in Section 6. These results show that the rm might have strong reasons to pursue a non-proprietary archi-27 tecture (outsourced stable module) in spite of the reduced revenues it obtains from the sales of each stable module unit. The intuition that the non-proprietary solution is more preferable when customers are wary of proprietary approaches or the rm is less capable in designing the stable module (low β) is indeed conrmed. However, the inuence of the customer's discount factor on the choice of the type of modular architecture is quite subtle, and goes to the very core of the benets of modular upgradability for rapidly improving products. Whereas these results hold when the discount factors of the rm and its customers are correlated through t d in industrial markets, the results can be dierent in consumer markets where the rm and individual consumers could dier in their relative patience to receive future benets. We discuss this issue in Appendix B.
Optimal Innovation Rates
In the previous sections, we have identied the optimal design architecture and pricing at a given rate of innovation (with δ(t d ) representing the innovation rate). We now endogenize the innovation rate and treat the inter-version time t d as a decision variable to study the impact of architecture on the optimal rate of innovation (while addressing customer regret and maximizing rm prot).
Specically, we compare the demand-driven optimal innovation rate t * d for the modular proprietary, non-proprietary and integral architectures 10 .
Deriving optimal innovation rates requires a model of development cost, and ours is based on the assumption that a specic set of resources will be dedicated to the product development eort. Prior studies have shown that there are diminishing returns to resource investment in product development (Graves, 1989) . To develop a product that delivers performance f (q 2 ) from the technology with potential q 2 , we model that the rm incurs a cost that depends on the development time t d , and the qualities of the early and improved versions, q 1 and q 2 . The prot expressions in earlier sections are expressed in terms of δ, which is bounded between 0 and 1; so it is convenient to express the functional form with respect to δ(t d ). The development cost is modeled to be:
Integral and Modular Proprietary Architectures
First, we compare the optimal rates of innovation under Modular Proprietary and Integral architectures. For any given inter-version time t d , the optimal prices set by the rm for each design choice is given by Propositions 1 and 2 above. The corresponding prots can be derived from Equations 5 and 7 in Section 3.2. The rm's total prot using the proprietary modular architecture as a function of the rate of innovation, t d , is:
Similarly, for the integral architecture, the prot is:
To obtain some basic insights, we compare the innovation rates for the proprietary modular and integral architectures when β = 1 and α = 0. No specic functional forms are required for comparing innovation rates under the two alternatives. We nd that when the rm's own modules are not inferior to the industry standards, and when there are no negative consequences of modularity, the rm has an incentive to innovate faster if it adopts a modular architecture for the system.
Proposition 6. Innovation under Modular and Integral Architectures
When there are no quality losses due to modularization (α = 0), modular proprietary architecture allows for a faster rate of innovation than an integral architecture without causing customer regret.
The above result that a modular design choice allows for faster optimal demand-driven innovation (even when any supply-side eciencies involved in modular design are not considered) is, to the best of our knowledge a new insight not found in the existing literature. Note that a higher price p s restricts the protability of both rst and second period sales. When the stable module is moderately expensive, under the non-proprietary approach, p s has a stronger constraining eect on rst period prices. The rm, which is now relatively less sensitive to rst period prots, makes an unencumbered decision to maximize discounted second period prots resulting in higher innovation rate under the non-proprietary architecture.
Conclusions
We investigated the role of product design and introduction timing in managing rapid sequential innovation. Driven by feedback from their investment-conscious customers, rms have begun oering an easier upgrading path using upgradable modules, a trend increasingly seen in industrial markets.
We attempted to formalize and analyze modular upgradability for sequentially improving products that yield customer productivity improvements. Our results provide a nuanced understanding of the role of a product's modular design in segmenting customers in a heterogeneous market when costs may be incurred in installing and upgrading modular products. Localizing product improvements and developing the product to be upgradable in modules ensures that initial investment by customers is not completely obsoleted by subsequent introduction of superior products, often outweighing any additional costs associated with modularity. Consequently, the seller prots more by leveraging the increased pricing freedom to segment customers without restraining the pace of innovation.
Furthermore, modular designs are also more conducive to a faster launch of improved versions -while prior research in Operations oers a resource-based motivation for modularity, we oer an alternative explanation for faster innovation in modular products from a market-adoption perspective (Section 5.2).
Our central contributions in this paper are the rst order insights that we derived about the connection between product architecture and market segmentation, which are typically analyzed in mutual isolation. With respect to the existing literature, we have added two additional degrees of freedom that include product architecture and introduction timing to help rms manage sequential innovation. Contrary to the suggestion that using industry standard components can be debilitating to the product line in the long run (Morris and Ferguson, 1993) , we nd that using non-proprietary components might indeed be an attractive option to realize the modular approach. In fact, there is a strong incentive to use standard subsystems when cost-side advantages of standard components are factored in. Whereas the understanding in previous research is that rms might indulge in opensourcing to encourage other rms to participate in innovation (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993) , we nd that adopting standard solutions for some modules can help rms achieve inter-temporal discrimination (section 4.3). Further, our analysis conrmed that the incentive for modularization and maintenance of proprietary control are dependent on design eects, product characteristics like the learning rate and market characteristics such as rm discount rates. When the direct or opportunity costs of modularization and proprietariness are high, non-proprietary or integral architectures may indeed be preferable.
The implication of this work for innovating rms going forward is that modular upgradable product design, introduction timing, and coordinated pricing can be valuable instruments for rms tomanage the market launch of rapidly improving products. By identifying regions of appropriateness of the dierent approaches to upgrading the product in modules, we are able to identify factors that a rm must recognize and inuence in designing improving products. We learned exactly how installation and upgrade costs (C I , C U ) make modular designs less valuable for the customers as well as the rm. In consumer products, even more than industrial products, these costs tend to be larger relative to the utilities derived from the products. While this result is consistent with the observation that modular designs are currently more prevalent in industrial sectors, it provides some basic guidance on pairing technologies and markets through product design. An emphasis on performance attributes alone often leads to complex product designs, and dense and intricate interfaces between functional modules (Simon, 1969) . We propose that in order to commercialize rapidly improving sequences of products, a rm should consider designing its products for upgradability. In addition to functional modularity and localization of improvements, products designed for upgradability will also enable customers to disassemble and quickly re-install the constituents of a product in an eortless manner.
In these rst steps in understanding how architecture inuences market segmentation, we have made some stylized assumptions. The long-run viability of product architectures needs to be addressed in the future by going beyond a two-period model. Selling a proprietary modular product results in an equilibrium with the same set of buyers in all periods; although it is successful in a 2-period model, this can lead to a stationary customer base, performance saturation (Krishnan and Zhu, 2003) , and increased competition. The single product, replacement model considered in this paper is in accordance with the body of work on rapid sequential innovation. In a more general replacement setup, Stokey (1988) suggests that periodic addition (deletion) of high (low) quality products results from industry-wide spillovers of learning experiences. We have also assumed that there is no resale market for such rapidly improving products. Although this can be enforced by the manufacturer for some goods, presence of second hand markets can moderate the eects of monopolistic opportunism considered in this paper.
The results presented in the paper are derived under the stylized supposition that production costs are negligible, however, numerical analysis shows that the fundamental results indeed continue to hold when production costs are considered. When marginal costs are negligible, and when modularization degrades product quality, oering trade-ins and buy-backs may, in fact, be moreprotable than opting for modular upgradeable designs. However, trade-in alternatives entail distribution, reverse logistics and disposal costs that could make them expensive for some products.
Further, the customer's lower incentive to maintain stable modules that will be returned through the trade-in creates undesirable moral hazard issues. Our discussion is focused on durable products such as industrial assembly systems which cannot be bought back without considerable risk for the rm and expense for the customer.
The insights generated from the paper oer a new and previously unknown rationale for modularizing the architecture in the context of rapid sequential innovation. The results also help decide when to use a proprietary modular architecture versus using an open systems approach. The application of these ideas can help ensure that rapid improvements can be realized without discouraging customers from purchasing these products, thereby stimulating market growth and prots for rms.
